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THE PROPOSED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Mr. Frank Olive, Chairman of the Property Section of
the Indiana State Bar Association, some time ago appointed
Mr. Verne Cawley of Elkhart, Mr. Leo Gardner of Indianap-
olis and Mr. Bernard C. Gavit of Bloomington as a com-
mittee to prepare a comprehensive revision of the Indiana
statutes of limitations. The committee has been ably assisted
in this project by Mr. Harry B. Littell, at that time a senior
student in the Indiana University School of Law. A compara-
tive study of the subject prepared by him was published in 21
Ind. L. J. 23-43 (1946). A tentative draft of the proposed
bill has been presented to two meeting of the State Bar As-
sociation and it is planned that a final draft will be presented
for consideration at the January meeting of the Association.
A copy of the proposed statute with supporting notes follows:
INTRODUCTION
This report is submitted in conjunction with the accom-
panying proposed Statute of Limitations. It does not pur-
port to be, however, an exhaustive analysis of the proposed
statute. In general, it attempts:
1. to point out analogous sections in the present statute
and if necessary to compare those sections with the
ones proposed;
2. to point out new sections which have no analogy in
the existing statute and to explain their inclusion
within the proposed statute;
3. to make a comparison, where necessary, with the
statutes of other states.
The background for the proposed statute has been a
study of the statutes of all the states. This study was cen-
tered principally on the substantive time-periods allowed,
but an absorption of the form and mechanical features of
each statute was to some extent unavoidable.
Again it is necessary to point out that this report is in-
tended only as an explanation, and not as an argumentative
justification, of the proposed statute.
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Following the enacting and policy section (§1), the sec-
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tions may be grouped under eight divisions in the following
order:
1. Construction of Act; Definitions (§2-5)
2. General Provisions (§§6-20)
3. Real Actions - Limitations (§§21-28)
4. Personal Actions - Limitations (§§29-41)
5. Disabilities (§§42-50)
6. Miscellaneous (§§§51-54)
7. Real Property-Marketable Title Statute (§§55-64)
8. Repealer (§65)
This arrangement was made mainly for clarity. It is
submitted that general rules pertaining to all limitations
should be grouped together and should precede the sections
setting forth the specific limitations. It is also desirable to
have all matters pertaining to disabilities grouped together.
In the statutes of most states sections pertaining to real ac-
tions and personal actions are grouped together and the form-
er are usually set forth first.
The proposed thirty-five year Marketable Title Statute
has been incorporated into the present statute. Although
its position in the statute might better be within the sections
relating to limitations on real actions, it is thought that be-
ing placed at the end of the statute would cause it to stand
out and would present a better idea of unity among the nine
sections pertaining to that subject.
A Bill for an Act Entitled:
An act concerning limitations of the time for commenc-
ing civil actions and prescribing the effect of certain dis-
abilities.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
State of Indiana: that, it is the intention of the legislature
to achieve the primary purpose of limiting the time in which
actions must be commenced, namely to cause a speedy settle-
ment of all claims and disputes, by prescribing shorter periods
for the commencing of actions and by making all actions and
all parties, including the State, its agencies, and political
subdivisions, subject to the limitations.
Comment. Of the propositions stated to compose the purpose and
policy of the proposed act only the second, that the limitations shall
be effective against the State, represents a departure from what would
be otherwise an ordinary revision of an existing statute. However,
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it is necessary to point out that the proposed act is a complete revision,
not'just an amendment, of the existing statue.
Section 2. Agreement to a Different Limitation. - All
actions shall be commenced within the times prescribed here-
in. Any agreement or stipulation specifying or permitting
a different time shall be void, but such an agreement or stipu-
lation shall not otherwise invalidate the transaction or in-
strument of which the invalid agreement or stipulation is a
part. This section shall not apply to contracts of insurance.
Comment. This section is implied in the statutes of all states and
specifically included in many. It is not stated in the present statute.
The exception in favor of insurance contracts is made in view of the
existing statutes pertaining to limitations on presentment of notice of
claim.
Section 3. All Actions Limited. - The time for com-
mencing every action is limited; and every action not specifi-
cally enumerated in this act or otherwise limited as pro-
vided in section four shall be included under the section pro-
vided for "all actions not otherwise limited".
Comment. At one time only certain causes of action had limitations.
It is now recognized that all civil actions are or should be, limited.
There are still several states whose statutes prescribe that only actions
enumerated in the statute are limited.
Section 4. When Other Limitations Are Valid. - If a
limitation is specifically provided in a statute creating a
cause of action, such limitation shall be valid and controll-
ing notwithstanding that it is not included within this act.
Causes of action created by federal legislation wherein suit
is permitted in state courts shall be included within the mean-
ing of this section.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2-603. This section
states the second sentence of § 2-603 in a more specific, although slight-
ly longer, form.
Section 5. Definitions. - As used in this act the term
"real property" includes any interest in land, tenements, here-
ditaments, and chattels-real; the term "personal property"
includes money, goods, chattels, evidences of debt, and choses
in action.
Where the State of Indiana is referred to, all agencies
and political subdivisions of the State shall be included.
The enumeration of a series of specific terms shall not
exclude other specific terms of the same class as the specific
terms enumerated.
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Section 6. Limitations Applicable to the State. - The
limitations prescribed herein shall apply to actions by the
State of Indiana or by a foreign state. Savings in favor of
disabilities shall apply to actions against the State or a for-
eign state. The limitations shall not apply to actions brought
by the United States.
Comment. This section restates as a rule the policy set forth in
section one. Eighteen states now permit the Statute of Limitations to
run against the state; two more allow it to run concerning real actions
only; four more concerning personal actions only. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §§ 2-613, 3-1411.
Section 7. Only Limitations of this State Applicable. -
The limitations of this State shall be applicable and controll-
ing in all actions regardless of where the cause of action ac-
crued, arose, originated, or became complete.
Comment. This section conforms to the usual Conflict of Laws
principle. Statutes of Limitations are usually considered "procedural"
and being a part of the procedural law of the forum will govern. How-
ever, in a few cases, the Statute of Limitations has been considered
"substantive"--this section will then obviate the often very close ques-
tion of the law of which State governs in this situation.
Section 8. When Action Is Commenced. - An action is
commenced when a complaint is filed. Sec. 55, Ch. 38 of
the Acts of 1881 (Spec. Sess.) [Burns' 1933, 2-802] is re-
pealed insofar as it prescribes a different time for the com-
mencements of an action.
Comment. This is intended to follow the Federal rule on when an
action is commenced.
Section 9. Concealment of Cause of Action. - If any
person liable to an action shall conceal the fact from the
knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be
commenced at any time within the period of limitations after
the discovery of the cause of action.
Comment. This is Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2-609. Many
states limit the provision to "concealed by fraud." Although there may
be little distinction in fact, it is submitted that the terminology of the
Indiana statute is more suitable.
Section 10. Effect of War. - When one of the parties
to an action is a citizen of a country with which the United
States is or has been at war, the period of the war or emer-
gency as declared by the United States shall not be a part of
the period allowed for bringing an action.
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Comment. Common in many states. Not in the present Indiana
statute.
Section 11. Party Restrained from Commencing Action.
- If a party is temporarily restrained from commencing an
action, or if a court is temporarily prohibited from hearing
an action, the time during which a party is restrained or a'
court is prohibited shall not be a part of the period allowed
for commencing action.
Section 12. Limitations Must Be Pleaded. - In order
to be used as a defense, the Statute of Limitation must be
specifically pleaded as a bar. Nothing herein shall prevent
an amendment of pleadings to include the Statute of Limita-
tions.
Comment. Not in present statute. Found in statutes of many
other states. Like several other sections, these propositions have been
accepted by the courts but have not been enunciated in a statute. It
is believed that they have a place in a "complete" statute.
Section 13. Counter-claim, Set-off. - A counter-claim
or set-off which was not barred at the time action was com-
menced by the plaintiff shall be a valid counter-claim or set-
off notwithstanding that it becomes barred before being as-
serted by the defendant.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (BurnsA 1933) §2-1036.
Section 14. New Promise to Remove Bar. - After a
cause of action is barred by the limitations set forth herein,
a new promise in order to be- effective in removing the bar
must be in writing and signed by the promisor.
Comment. Substantially the same as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§ 2-610.
Section 15. Indorsement Noting Partial Payment.. -
An indorsement noting partial payment of a promissory note
or of any contract or promise to pay money shall not be a
sufficient writing to remove or to prevent the bar, except
when the endorsement is signed by the maker or the person
to be charged.
Nothing contained in this section shall take away or les-
sen the effect'of any payment made by any person; but no
indorsement. or memorandum of any, payment made upon
any instrument of writing, by or on behalf of the party to
whom the payment shall purport to be made, shall be deemed
sufficient to exempt the case from the provisions of this Act.
19471
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Comment. Substantially the same as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-612, except the first sentence places this section on a parity with
Section 14 of the proposed statute.
Section 16. New Promise-Whom Affected. - A new
promise after action is barred is effective only against the
person so promising and shall not bind a joint-debtor, joint-
promissor, co-surety, joint-administrator, joint-contractor,
or any other person who was formerly liable on the same
cause of action with the person making the new promise.
Comment. Substantially the same as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-611.
Section 17. Effect of Payment by Joint-Debtor, Etc. -
If one joint-debtor or any person jointly or severally liable
on a cause of action shall make a payment after the cause of
action is barred, the other persons formerly jointly or sev-
erally liable shall not be liable to the person making payment.
This provision applies also to persons in the relation of prin-
cipal-surety.
Comment. Substantially the same as Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-615.
Section 18. New Promise before Bar. - A new promise
for a valuable consideration before the action is barred shall
cause the statute to start running anew, but the action shall
be on the new promise and not the old. In order for an in-
dorsement noting partial payment to be effective as a new
promise under this section, in addition to the requirement
of a valuable consideration it must be signed by the maker or
the person to be charged.
Comment. This is intended to settle the problem whether suit
should be on the old or new promise. It is recognized that this pertains
more to the substantive law of contracts, and it is not considered a
"necessary" section of the act.
Section 19. Limitations Continue to Run When Once
Started. - Except as otherwise provided in this act, once the
limitation begins to run on a cause of action, no subsequent
event will stop or interrupt the running of the limitations.
Comment. Another recognized rule but not stated in the present
statute. In this connection, it might be pointed out that the present
exceptions for stopping the running of the statute when the defendant
is a non-resident or absent from the State [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§2-606] have been omitted. If the defendant can be served with pro-
cess there is no reason why the statute should not run; if the defend-
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ant is a resident of another state, the plaintiff should go to that state
to settle his claim or bring his action.
Section 20. When Cause of Action Accrues. - Except as
specifically provided herein, the cause of action in any action
shall accrue from the time when all of the elements or condi-
tions constituting such cause of action have come into ex-
istence.
Comment. This section may also be considered as "academic." It
is not a necessary section but adds to the completeness of the act.
Section 21. Real Property: Actions Concerning Title or
Possession. - All actions concerning title to, or possession of,
real property shall be commenced within six years.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-602 (cl. 6).
The reduction from twenty to six years brings Indiana below the aver-
age of all states (many of whom also still have very long periods for
real actions); but it brings us into line with the trend of lowering
limitations on this action and it also tends, to achieve the primary pur-
pose of a Statute of Limitations as set out in section one of the pro-
posed act.
Section 22. Real Property: Action by the State. - All
actions concerning title to, or possession of, real property
brought by the State shall be commenced within ten years;
but causes of. like nature in which the State is a party de-
fendant shall be commenced within six years.
Comment. It is not uncommon where the statute runs against the
state to allow the state a longer period. This is true of real actions
only.' Cf. California, Idaho, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, and
others.
Section 23. When Limitations not Applicable to Real
Property of the State. - The limitations of this act shall not
apply to an interest in real property of the State devoted
to uses of public thoroughfares, including highways, streets,
alleys, and sidewalks.
Comment. Even in those states where the Statute runs against the
state, it is not unusual to find some exemptions in favor of certain
property of the state. Justi how far these exemptions are to extend is
a matter of policy, as is the primary question whether there are to be
any exemptions in favor of the state.t
Section 24. Recovery of Real Property Sold by Order
of Court. - All actions attacking the validity of a sale of real
property pursuant to an order of a court, whether by direct
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judgment or order of sale or on execution in satisfaction of
a judgment, shall be commenced within one year.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-602 (cls. 3, 4). Only
a dozen states make a distinction between recovery of real property
sold by court order and recovery of real property in other cases. The
reasons for desiring a judicial sale of realty to become conclusive in
as short a time as possible are numerous.
Section 25. Adverse Possession; Payment of Taxes not
Required. - Nothing in this Act shall relieve any adverse pos-
sessor or claimant from proving all the elements of title by
adverse possession now required by law, except that an ad-
verse possessor or claimant in order to establish his ad-
verse title or claim need not have paid any taxes or assess-
ments falling due on property claimed during the period he
claims to have possessed the same adversely. Section 1, Ch.
42 of the Acts of 1927 [Burn's 1933, 3-1314] is repealed.
Comment. It is believed that Ind. Acts 1927, c. 27, Ind. Stat Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §3-1314 is undesirable. An attempt to put into statutory
form a definition of the elements of adverse possession, although found
in several states, was also thought inadvisable.
Section 26. Mortgages, Vendor's Liens: Limitation:
When Cause Accrues. - All actions to foreclose mortgages or
vendor's liens on real property shall be commenced within six
years. The cause of action shall accrue from the date the debt
secured by such mortgage or vendor's lien is due, or in case
of debts paid by installments, from the date the last install-
ment is due. Insofar as this Act is concerned, an accelera-
tion clause shall have no effect upon the time when the cause
of action accrues, but the time when the debt or last install-
ment is ultimately due shall control.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-623. The provision
relating to an acceleration clause is thought desirable to prevent un-
certainty in the case of a purchaser from either the mortgagor or mort-
gagee.
Section 27. Mortgages, Vendor's Liens: Due Date of
Debt not Shown. When Cause of Action Accrues. - If the
mortgage or vendor's lien, or the record thereof, does not
show the due date of the last installment, the cause of action
shall accrue from the date of execution of the mortgage or
lien; and in the event this date is also omitted, then the cause
of action shall accrue from the date of the recording of the
mortgage or the lien.
. Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-624.
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Section 28. Mortgages, Vendor's Liens: Affidavit to
Show Due Date. .- If the mortgage or vendor's lien, or the
record thereof, does not show the due date of the last in-
stallment, the holder of the mortgage or lien may at any time
within six years from the date of execution of the mortgage
or lien, or from the date of recording if the record does not
show the date of execution, file for record in the same office
where the mortgage or lien is recorded, an affidavit setting
forth the due date of the mortgage or lien or the date of the
last installment. The recorder shall note the filing of the
affidavit on the record of the mortgage or lien and shall
show where in the record books such affidavit may be found.
The effect of such an affidavit when recorded shall be the
same as if the due date was originally stated in the mortgage
or lien. The affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of the
truth of the statements therein.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-625. The clause
in the present sections §§2-624-2-625 authorizing the recorder upon re-
quest of the record owner to certify that the mortgage or vendor's lien
has become satisfied by lapse of time has been intentionally omitted.
Such a certification would be in fact ineffectual and perhaps misleading.
Section 29. Injury to, Trespass upon Real Property. -
All actions for injury to, detention of, or trespass upon real
property shall be commenced within three years.
Section 30. Rents, Profits, for Use of Real Property. -
All actions to recover rents, profits, or for the use of real
property shall be commenced within three years.
Comment. §§29-30. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-601 (cls.
2,3).
Section 31. Personal Property: Injury to, Recovery of
Possession. - All actions for injury to, detention of, or re-
covery of possession of personal property shall be commenced
within three years.
Section 32. Written Contracts. - All actions founded
upon written contracts shall be commenced within six years.
Section 33. Promissory Notes, Bills of Exchange, Etc.
- All actions upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, or
any contract to pay money shall be commenced within six
years.
Section 34. Oral Contracts. - All actions founded upon
1947]
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contracts not in writing shall be commenced within three
years.
Section 35. Accounts. - All actions upon accounts shall
be commenced within three years. The cause of action in an
action upon an account shall accrue from the date of the last
transaction causing an item in the account, which, in an ac-
tion upon a balance due of a mutual, open, and current ac-
count, shall be the date of the last transaction on either
side.
Section 36. Three-year Limitations. - The following
actions shall be commenced within three years:
1. Actions against a public officer for misfeasance, mal-
feasance, or non-feasance; or actions upon the bond
or against the surety of a public officer for the same
causes.
2. Actions against an executor or administrator or
against the bond or surety of an executor or adminis-
trator.
3. Actions for relief against fraud.
4. Actions upon a liability created by statute, except
for forfeiture of a penalty.
Section 37. Two-Year Limitations. - The following ac-
tions shall be commenced within two years:
1. Actions for injury to the person, including actions
for assault, battery, false imprisonment, wrongful
death, seduction, and criminal conversation.
2. Actions for malpractice growing out of professional
services of lawyers and of physicians, surgeons, den-
tists, hospitals, sanitariums, and other institutions
wherein medicine is practiced.
Section 38. One-Year Limitations. - The following ac-
tions shall be commensed within one year:
1. Actions for injury to the character of a person, in-
cluding libel, slander, and malicious prosecution.
2. Actions to enforce or recover upon a mechanic's lien.
The cause of action shall accrue from the date of fil-
ing notice of the lien.
3. Actions to recover forfeiture of a penalty by statute,
whether recovery is sought by an individual or the
State.
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Section 39. Action to Contest a Will. - All actions to
contest the validity of any will or to resist the probate there-
of shall be commenced within one year. The cause of action
shall accrue from the date the will is offered for probate.
No longer period shall be allowed for infants, insane persons,
or persons absent from the State.
Section 40. Municipal Improvement Liens. - All actions
to enforce or to recover upon a lien created by assessments
for municipal improvements shall be commenced within four
years. The cause of action shall accrue from the date such
assessment is due, or in case of assessments paid by install-
ments, from the date the last installment is due.
Section 41. All Actions Not Otherwise Limited. - All
actions or suits not otherwise limited by the provisions of
this act shall be commenced within five years.
Comment, §§31-41. Little comment is needed on these sections which
prescribe limitations on personal actions. In most instances, the periods
have been shortened but only in three causes of actions has there been
a drastic reduction: 1. written contracts, 2. municipal improvement
liens, 3. "all other actions."
Concerning written contracts [Section 32 and 33, cf. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §2-602, cls. 5, 6], Indiana has been brought into con-
firmity with the other states. The same is true of "all other actions"
(Section 41; cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-603).
Section 39 is intended to change the present Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) §7-504 so as to make the one-year limitation effective as to every
contestant. The present section (§7-504) allows three years to infants,
persons of unsound mind, and persons absent from the state.
Concerning municipal improvement liens (Section 40; cf. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §§2-620-2-621) the distinction between assessments pay-
able at one time and those payable by installments have been dropped
except that the cause of action does not accrue in the installment cases
until the due date of last installment. Under the proposed section the
lien would cease and the action become barred at the same time.
In general, compare Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§2-601-2-602; 2-604;
2-618-2-621; 2-627.
Section 42. Disabilities. - The following disabilities
shall be included within the meaning of this act:
1. Infancy
2. Insanity
However, no person shall be considered to be under a
disability who is in the custody of a guardian, either legal
or natural.
Comment. This is the most direct approach to the problem of
1947]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [
excluding minors and insane persons who are in custody of guardians
from the ordinary protections afforded persons considered to be un-
der a disability. Under the proposed section the meaning of disability
is narrowed so as to exclude such persons altogether. Making this ex-
clusion has been an almost unaimous request from the members of the
bar.
Section 43. Disabilities: When Effective. - A disability
must exist at the time a cause of action accrues in favor of
the person under the disability in order to be effective to
extend the time within which an action must be commenced.
Section 44. More Than One Disability. - When a person
is under more than one disability at the time a cause of action
accrues in his favor, all disabilities existing at the time the
cause of action accrues must be removed before the extension
of time provided in section fifty-one begins to run.
Section 45. Disabilities in Successive Persons. - Dis-
abilities in successive persons in whose favor a cause of action
has accrued may not be tacked.
Comment, §§43-45. These general provisions state accepted rules and
are found in the statutes of many states. These rules have been adopted
in Indiana through the courts but they have not been set out in a
statute.
Section 46. Disabilities: Extension of Time after Dis-
ability Ceases. - Any person under a disability at the time a
cause of action in his favor accrues may commence his action
within two years or within the number of years otherwise
prescribed for such action, whichever is shorter, after the
disability ceases.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-605. The reason
for the clause requiring an action to be commenced in less than two
years after the disability ceases where the limitation for the action
is less than two years is obvious. Otherwise a person under a dis-
ability would be entitled to a longer period after the disability ceases
than one never under a disability.
Some states set two standards for disabilities: one for real actions
and one for personal actions allowing a longer extension for real
actions. It is submitted that the Indiana practice allowing the same
extension for both is the better.
Section 47. When Disability Ceases before Normal Lim-
itation Has Expired. - When a person is under a disability
at the -time a cause of action in his favor accrues, but the
disability ceases before the normal limitation for such cause
of action has expired, such person may commence his ac-
Vol. 2
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tion within times provided in section fifty-one or within the
time otherwise prescribed for such action, whichever is long-
er.
Comment. This section is also mainly academic inasmuch as it
is a rule followed by the courts but not stated in statutory form.
Section 48. Duty of Guardian. - It shall be the duty of
the guardian, whether legal or natural, of an infant or of an
insane person to assert all claims and causes of action which
have accrued in favor of his ward.
Comment. Since this duty of a guardian is not specifically set
forth in our statutes pertaining to a guardianship (see Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §§8-114, 8-207) it was'thought advisable to include it
expressly in view of the changed definition of "disability" and the ef-
fect of this and the following sections generally.
Section 49. Action to Compel Assertion of Claim. - Any
person who is or may be subject to suit or claim by a person
under a 'disability may bring an action against the person
under the disability in whose favor a cause of action has
arisen to compel the assertion of the claim and may require
the court to appoint a gardian ad litem to assert the claim
or cause of action on behalf of the person under a disability.
Service of process shall be made in the same manner as if
the person subject to a claim were bringing an action against
the person under a disability.
Comment. This section, along with the other important changes
in this field of disabilities, has been requested by the bar.
Section 50. Judgement Final. - Where a person under
a disability is represented by a guardian, whether natural,
legal or guardian ad litem, in an action brought against him
or brought by a person under a disability through such a
guardian, the judgement in any such action shall be final and
the same as if the person were not under a disability; and no
cause of action or right to review or to set aside any such
judgement shall remain to such a person because of the dis-
ability.
Comment. The purpose of this section is to allow the cause of
action of a person under a disability to be litigated completely and to
cut off the right to review or appeal. The effect of sections 42, 48 and
49 of the proposed act would make it possible for any claim of a person
under a disability, in the present meaning of that word, to be litigated.
This section merely amounts to a declaration that such litigation shall
be final. Were such litigation not final, the value of the preceding
sections would be doubtful.
1947]
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Section 51. Death of Party; Additional Time. - Where
it is provided that a cause of action urvives, if any person
in whose favor or against whom a cause of action has ac-
crued, dies within one year before the expiration of the time
limited for the action, the cause of action which survives
either to or against his representative may be commenced
within one year from the death of the party; but if the party
dies any time before one year from the expiration of the
time limited for the action, the action must be commenced
within the regular time prescribed for such action.
Comment. Cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-607. Time re-
duced from one and one-half years to one year.
Section 52. Judgement Presumed Satisfied. - A judge-
ment of any court of the United States, of this State, or of
any other State shall be conclusively presumed satisfied after
twenty years.
Section 53. Action to Renew Judgement Abolished. -
An action shall not be brought in any court of this State to
renew a judgement of any court of this State of the United
States, or of any foreign State.
Comment, §52-53. The time for enforcing a judgment has been left
at twenty years but the action to renew a judgment has been abolished.
This will give a successful plaintiff from twenty to twenty-six years
in which to secure satisfaction of a judgment, which is thought to be
quite sufficient. These two sections are included instead of reducing
the time in which a judgment must be enforced but permitting re-
newal judgments.
Section 54. Extension of Time to Causes Now Accrued.
- Any cause of action which has accrued before the effective
date of this act and which would become barred by the pro-
visions of this act at once or before 'one year from the ef-
fective date because of reduction in time for bringing ac-
tions may be commenced within one year from the effective
date of this act.
Comment. It has been held that a revision of limitations may be
made effective as to existing causes of action, provided that a reason-
able time is permitted after the new limitations become effective to
assert the existing causes of action. Just how long is a reasonable
time can never be definitely said. Thirty days has been held reason-
able and six months insufficient. However, a year is thought surely
to be sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of making the act ef-
fective to existing causes of action.
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Section 55. Claims over Thirty-Five Years Old Affect-
ing Real Property. - Except as provided in the following
sections, no action affecting the posession or title of real
property shall be commenced which is founded upon either:
1. An unrecorded instrument executed more than thirty-
five years prior to the commencement of the action, or
2. An instrument recorded more than thirty-five years
prior to the commencement of the action which is held
by a person not in possession, either himself or
through a tenant, at the time the action is commenced,
or
3. A transaction, act, event, or omission occurring more
than thirty-five years prior to the commencement of
the action.
This section shall not be construed to extinguish any
interests which are inherent in the provisions and limitations
contained in the muniments of title of the record title own-
er nor to give a record title owner any estate or interest in
real property greater than that which the muniments of his
title purport to convey.
Comment. Cf. Wis. Acts 1941, c. 293, §1. The number of years
(35) was adopted arbitrarily. A final determination of this figure is
a matter of policy. Michigan allows 40 years, Wisconsin 30, Minne-
sota 50.
Section 56. Filing Notice to Maintain Claim. - The pro-
visions of Section 55 shall be ineffective to the extent con-
tained in the following sections, if within the thirty-five year
period there is filed for recording a verified notice of a claim
of interest in real property and an action is commenced there-
on as prescribed in the following sections.
Comment. Cf. Wis. Acts 1941, c. 293, §1; Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200,
3. It has been thought desirable to split the contents of section one
of the Wisconsin act into several sections for one reason to make the
sections shorter and easier to read. The last sentence of section one
of the Wisconsin act which read "Such notice filed after the expiration
of the thirty years shall likewise be effective, except as to the rights
of a purchaser for value of the real estate or any interest therein which
may have arisen prior to such filing," has not been included in the
proposed act. Such a provision it seems in part defeats the *purpose
of the act which, while primarily is to protect purchasers for value,
is also to give the record title holder a marketable title which he can
rely on without regard to occurrences more than thirty-five years in
the past unless a notice of claim has been filed.
Section 57. Notice of Claim: Requirements; Manner of
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Filing. - The notice of claim to be effective and to be entitled
to record shall contain:
1. A complete and accurate description of all land af-
fected by the claim,
2. The full name of the claimant or claimants,
3. The full name of the present record owners of the
land, if known,
4. A complete descripition of the instrument or tran-
saction (act, event, or omission) upon which the
claim is founded, with the date, volume, and page of
recording if it be recorded.
The notice of claim shall be filed for record in the office
of the recorder of the county or counties where the land de-
scribed therein is situated. The recorder shall record full
copies thereof in the same manner that deeds are recorded
and he shall be entitled to fees for the recording thereof as
are charged for recording deeds. In indexing such notices
the recorder shall enter such notice in the grantee indexes of
deeds under the names of the claimants appearing in such
statements, and under the names of the present (grantee) re-
cord owners of the land, if known.
Comment. Cf. Mich Acts 1946, No. 200, §5. The most difficult
job in setting up a provision for recording a notice of claim is to
provide a manner of giving actual notice to a purchaser and the record
title owner. It is true that constructive notice by recording will suf-
fice but any recording should as near as possible try to provide actual
notice. It is obvious that the focal point is in the indexing. The
difficulty of giving actual notice in this situation is not easy to over-
come. An attempt has been made to insure actual notice by indexing the
notice under the name of the actual record title holder. The number of
cases when this person is not known or not ascertainable should be very
few. It is submitted that this problem merits close attention and that
the proposed section be strengthened if possible or changed if necessary
to provide a recording which will give actual notice. Otherwise the
act will be of doubtful benefit to a purchaser who cannot discover
whether a notice of claim has been recorded.
Section 58. Notice of Claim: Effect of Recording. -
The filing of a notice of claim of interest shall extend for
one year from the date of filing the time in which an action
founded upon the instrument or transaction set forth in the
notice may be commenced. If an action is not commenced on
the claim set forth within one year from the time of filing,
it shall be completely barred and all rights under such notice
shall terminate.
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Comment. Cf. Minn. Acts 1943, c. 529, §2. How many years P.
recording shall extend the time for commencing action, and whether
or not a re-recording should be allowed, are of course matters of policy.
The Minnesota act allows one year, the Illinois act ten years. The
number of years in Wisconsin and Michigan (the latter by implication)
is the same as the number of years originally allowed for recording.
The Wisconsin act specifically authorizes a re-recording. The Michi-
gan act is silent on this matter but it is thought that such authorization
is implied. (See, 44 Mich. L.R. 45, 54).
Section 59. Marketable Title after Thirty-Five Years.
Record Ownership. - A record title owner who has unbroken
chain of title for thirty-five years and against whose title
no notice of claim has been filed shall have a marketable
title to such land. Any purchaser for value of the land or
of any interest therein shall take free of any claim not filed
for record as required by this act. Although the record title
owner need not himself be in actual possession of the real
property, the provisions of this act are inoperative if the real
property is in hostile adverse possession of another persom.
This section shall be construed to mean that the record title
owner shall have a marketable title of that interest in the real
property which the muniments of his title purport to convey
to him.
Comment. Cf. Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200, §§1, 3. This section is
included as an optional section. In effect, it states in positive form
what has been stated in section one of the proposed act in negative
form. However, if it is thought desirable to state the whole statute
in positive rather than negative form, more will have to be done than
merely, substituting this section for section one.
The Michigan act goes to some length to describe in whose favor the
statute may operate. It is believed that it would be simpler to extend
the act in favor of all record title owners, with the exception of those
whose lands are in hostile adverse possession of another. The require-
ment found in the Michigan act that there must have been a convey-
ance to the present record holder or to the person from whom he claims
within the forty year (Michigan) period in order to have an unbroken
chain of title has not been included in the proposed act.
Section 60. Other Statute of Limitations not Affected. -
This act does not extend nor legsen the right to commence
any action beyond the time at which such right is barred by
any other statute, nor does it affect the acquisition of title
to real property by adverse possession.
Comment. Cf. Wis. Acts 1941, c.293, §3; Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200,
§7. Section 61. Disability, Lack of Knowledge. - No dis-
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-ability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of any-
one shall suspend the running of the thirty-five year periods.
A notice of claim of interest in real property may -be filed for
record by the claimant or by any person acting on behalf of
any claimant who is (1) under a disability, or (2) unable to
assert the claim on his own behalf, oR (3) one of a class but
whose identity cannot be established- or is uncertain at the
time of filing such notice for record.
Comment. Cf. Mich. Acts 1945, 46.200, §3; Wis. Acts 1941, c.293,
§4. It should be evident that it makes no difference whether the record
title holder knows or does not know of any outstanding claims before
they are recorded. (See also the comment on section 64 of the pro-
posed act.)
Section 62. To Whom not Applicable. - This act shall
not bar any lessor or his successor as reversioner of his right
to possession on expiration of any lease by reason of failure
to file notice; nor shall it bar any mortgagee or his successor
of his rights under a mortgage extending for more than thir-
ty-five years by reason of failure to file notice.
Comment. Cf. Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200, §4. Probably the act
would be construed not to affect the interests excepted in this section.
However, it is thought desirable to state them.
Section 63. Construction of Act. - Sections 55 through
62 of this act shall be construed to effect the legislative pur-
pose of simplifying and facilitating land transaction by allow-
ing person dealing with the record title ownerI to rely on the
record title covering a period of not more than thirty-five
years prior to the date of such dealing; and to that end to
extinguish all claims to an interest in the real estate being
dealt with, the existence of which claims arise out of or de-
pend on any act, transaction, event, or omission which oc-
curred prior to the thirty-five year period, unless within the
thirty-five year period there has been filed for record a
notice of the claim as provided in this act. The claims ex-
tinguished shall include any and all interests of any nature
including statutory rights given in lieu of dower or curtesy,
reversions, tax deeds, rights as heirs or under wills, and.
whether such claims are asserted by a person for himself
or for another, whether such person is within or without the
state, whether such person is natural or corporate, private
or governmental.
Comment. Cf. Wis. Acts 1941, c.293, §4; Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200,
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§6. This is in many respects the most important section in the act;
As was pointed out before, the Wisconsin and Michigan acts would
appear to be dissimilar were it not that the sections in each act con-
struing the legislative intent are for most purposes identical. Minnesota
has also an almost identical section in its act.
Section 64. Extension of Time to Existing Claims. - No
interest or claim shall be barred by the provisions, Sections
55 through 63, of this act until the lapse of two years (one
year) from its effective date. Any interest or claim which
would be otherwise barred upon passage or before the lapse
of two years (one year) may be preserved and kept effective
by filing for record a notice of claim as required by this act
within the two year (one year) period after passage,
Comment, §§55-64. In general. Sections 55 to 64 comprise what was
originally drafted as a separate statute. In view of the fact that it is
closely allied to the Statute of Limitations, and in fact may appropriate-
ly be considered as a part thereof, it has been engrafted, as a whole
into the present act.
The general sources from which these sections were constructed are
Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200 and Wis. Acts 1941, c. 293, Wis Stat. (1941)
§330.15. Comparable acts of other states were not overlooked. (See,
Ill. Acts 1941, v. I, p. 854; Minn. Acts 1943, c. 320; Iowa Code (1939)
§11024;Ind. Acts 1941, c. 141, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1942)
§2-6264
The chief difference between the Michigan and Wisconsin acts lies
in the fact that the latter is a part of the Statute of Limitations while
the former is not. Both are directed toward the same purpose as is
evident from the section of each statute setting forth the intention of
the legislature. It is therefore a matter of policy, or of choice, whether
the "positive" or "negative" approach is made to the subject.
For the most part the proposed act is drafted in the negative form,
i.e., as a Statute of Limitations. It is believed that the Wisconsin act
approaches the subject more directly and with less confusion of mean-
ing than the Michigan act. An attempt has been made to include the
desirable features of both and in more than one instance the ideas and
terminology of the Michigan statute have been incorporated into the
proposed act.
Comment. Cf. Mich. Acts 1945, No. 200, §9. The provision for a
two year (one year) period after the effective date should save any
question of constitutionality of the statute even though it operates on ex-
isting interests. See Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-A Statutory
Step" (1945) 44 Mich. L.Rev. 45, 55. It might be well to compare the com-
ment (1941) 17 Ind. L.J. 176 which raises the question of the validity of a
statute which is operative "retrospectively on vested property rights."
This comment also discusses the question of what are "vested property
rights." At least one thing is certain-the intention of this proposed
act is to accomplish exactly what the author of the comment interprets
was not the intention of the legislature in passing the 1941 act.
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As Aigler points out, Statutes of Limitations have always been held
constitutional-and likewise they may operate on existing claims pro-
viding a "reasonable" time is allowed to assert these claims after
passage of the act.
Section 65. Repealer. - All laws or parts of laws in con-
flict with this act are repealed and the following laws are
specifically repealed: Acts 1881, Chapter 38, sections 37, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54; Acts 1909,
Chapter 137, sections 3, 4, 6, 7; Acts 1923, Chapter 113, sec-
tion 1; Acts 1937, Chapter 97, sections 1, 2, 3; Acts 1941,
Chapter 141, section 1; Acts 1941, Chapter 116, section 1;
Acts 1927, Chapter 42, section 1 [which are listed in Burns
as 2-601 through 2-627; 2-1036; 3-1314].
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Comment. It is believed desirable to repeal specifically the former
acts constituting the Statute of Limitations, especially since some of
the existing sections have been intentionally omited.
The general repealing clause ("all conflicting laws") following the
specific repeals is of doubtful value. Likewise, the repeal of portions
of Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§2-802, 7-504, which do not form a
part of the Statute of Limitations, presents a problem of validity.
[Vol. 22
